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Abstract 
 
 
In this note, we attempt to place the question of how we got to the global financial 
crisis that began as the US Subprime debacle in the summer of 2007 in the context of an 
international and historical comparative setting.  It is of some poignancy that the “we” 
here refers to the wealthiest economies in the world which had, as late as 2006, been 
enjoying the benefits of the so-called “Great Moderation.”  The “Great Moderation”, was 
a term used to describe (and extrapolate from) the drop in macroeconomic volatilty in the 
advanced economies since the late 1980s.  As the business cycle had been “tamed”, 
financial crises of the severity and duration of what we are undergoing in the US and 
elsewhere in Europe were deemed improbable. At the time, a sovereign default in a 
eurozone country was inconceivable.   
 
JEL: E6, E44, F3, F30, N20 and N0.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*This note was prepared for The Occupy Handbook, Janet Byrne, editor). New York: Little, 
Brown and Co., 2012). 
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Introduction 
“There is nothing new except what is forgotten.” 
Mlle. Rose Bertin 
 
The financial press has often characterized the 2007-2008 United States subprime 
mess as a new breed of crisis.  Indeed, this view often points to the international 
repercussions of the U.S.-based crisis as evidence that the globalization of financial 
portfolios has introduced new channels for spillovers that were never present before.  In 
light of the unfolding Greek tragedy, there is also considerable confusion in academic and 
policy circles as to whether the shaky predicament of the global economy owes to new 
forms of contagion channels or to shared (common) economic fundamentals.  
In this note, we attempt to place the question of “how we got here” in the context 
of an international and historical comparative setting.  It is of some poignancy that the 
“we” here refers to the wealthiest economies in the world which had, as late as 2006, 
been enjoying the benefits of the so-called “Great Moderation.”  The “Great 
Moderation”, was a term used to describe (and extrapolate from) the drop in 
macroeconomic volatilty in the advanced economies since the late 1980s.  As the 
business cycle had been “tamed”, financial crises of the severity and duration of what we 
are undergoing in the US and elsewhere in Europe were deemed improbable. At the time, 
a sovereign default in a eurozone country was inconceivable.   
Our approach does not dwell on (no doubt) important idiosynchratic features of 
the unfolding crisis in each of the advanced economies.  Instead, as to the causes of great 
crises (the current one will almost certainly figure among the greatest), we next focus on 
those factors that are common across time and geography; we discriminate between root 
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causes of the crisis, its symptoms, and features such as financial regulation which serve 
as amplifiers of the boom-bust cycle.  Pertinent to the financial globalization era that has 
unfolded since the 1980s, our discussion begins with the link between financial 
liberalization (internal and external), the financial innovation and credit booms these 
spawn and banking cries. This is a “nutshell” version of the analysis of banking crises in 
Reinhart and Rogoff (2009)—henceforth RR (2009). 
I. The Setting 
Across countries and over the centuries, economic crises of all type follow a 
similar pattern.  An innovation emerges. Sometimes it is a new tool of science of 
industry, such as the diving bell, steam engine, or the radio. Sometime it is a tool of 
financial engineering, such as the joint-stock company, junk bonds, or collateralized debt 
obligations.  These usually accompany or are a direct result of financial liberalization, as 
described above. Investors may be wary at first, but then they see that extraordinary 
returns appear available on these new instruments and they rush in. Financial 
intermediaries—banks and investment companies—stretch their balance sheets so as not 
to be left out. The upward surge in asset prices continues, and that generation of financial 
market participants concludes that rules have been rewritten: Risk has been tamed, and 
leverage is always rewarded.  All too often, policy makers assert that the asset-price 
boom is a vote of confidence on their regime—that “this time is different”.1 Only 
seldom, to our knowledge, do they protest that perhaps the world has not changed and 
that the old rules of valuation still apply.  
But the old rules do apply. The asset price rise peters out, sometimes from 
exhaustion on its own or sometimes because of a real shock to the economy. This exposes 
                                                 
1 The this time is different syndrome is defined in Box 1. 
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the weaknesses of the balance sheets of those who justified high leverage by the 
expectation of outsized capital gains. Many financial firms admit losses, and some 
ultimately fail. All those financial firms hunker down, constricting credit availability in 
an effort to slim their balance sheets. With wealth lower and credit harder to get, 
economic activity typically contracts. Only after the losses are flushed out of the financial 
system and often with the encouragement of lagging monetary and fiscal ease does the 
economy recover. 
 
Box 1. The “this time is different syndrome” 
 
The essence of the “this time is different syndrome” is simple.  It is rooted in the firmly- 
held belief that financial crises are something that happen to other people in other 
countries at other times; crises do not happen here and now to us.  We are doing things 
better, we are smarter, we have learned from the past mistakes. The old rules of valuation 
no longer apply.  The current boom, unlike the many booms that preceded catastrophic 
collapses in the past (even in our country), is built on sound fundamentals, structural 
reforms, technological innovation, and good policy. Or so the story goes. 
 
For anyone needing an example of the timelessness of the collective self-delusion 
encapsulated in the this time is different syndrome, please consult Box 2. 
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Box 2. THE “THIS TIME IS DIFFERENT SYNDROME” ON THE EVE OF THE CRASH OF 1929 
 
 
 
 
 
New York, New York  (now the home of Chipotle Mexican Grill) 
 
Saturday Evening Post, September 14, 1929 
 
This advertisement was kindly sent to the authors by Professor Peter Lindert. 
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II. The Roots of Financial Crises 
There is a striking correlation between freer capital mobility and the incidence of 
banking crises, as shown in Figure 2.  Periods of high international capital mobility 
have repeatedly produced international banking crises, not only famously as they did in 
the 1990s, but historically.  The figure plots a three-year moving average of the share of 
all countries experiencing banking crises on the right scale.  On the left scale, we graph 
the index of capital mobility, due to Obstfeld and Taylor (2004), updated and back cast 
using their same design principle, to cover our full sample period.  While the Obstfeld–
Taylor index may have its limitations, we feel it nevertheless provides a concise summary 
of complicated forces by emphasizing de facto capital mobility based on actual flows.  
For the post-1970 period, Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) present formal evidence 
on the links of crises with financial liberalization.  In 18 of the 26 banking crises they 
study, the financial sector had been liberalized within the preceding five years, usually 
less.  In the 1980s and 1990s most liberalization episodes were associated with financial 
crises of varying severity.  Only in a handful of countries (for instance, Canada) did 
financial sector liberalization proceed smoothly.  Specifically, the paper presents 
evidence that the probability of a banking crisis conditional on financial liberalization 
having taken place is higher than the unconditional probability of a banking crisis.  
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Figure 2. Capital Mobility and the Incidence of Banking Crises:  
All Countries, 1800-2010 
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Sources:   Updated from Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein. 
Notes: This sample includes all countries.  On the left scale, we updated our favorite index of capital 
mobility, admittedly arbitrary, but a concise summary of complicated forces.  The smooth red line shows 
the judgmental index of the extent of capital mobility given by Obstfeld and Taylor (2004), back cast from 
1800 to 1859. 
 
III. The Symptoms of Financial Crises 
The recurring historical pattern described above is associated with some well-
defined symptoms.  We focus here on a few of the symptoms or quantitative parallels 
(those listed in Table 1) that have been present during the current crisis in several 
countries  and that we have seen systematically in numerous earlier crises in advanced and 
emerging market economies alike.2  Specifically, large capital inflows, sharp housing and 
equity price run-ups lead the “leading indicator” group.  So have been surges in private 
domestic and external debts.   These symptoms are quantifiable, unlike the more nebulous 
amplifiers that are discussed in the remainder of this section.  
                                                 
2 These and other economic and financial indicators are analyzed in detail in Kaminsky and Reinhart 
(1999).   
7 
 
 . 
Table 1. Quantitative antecedents of financial crises: 
The “lead” of the leading indicators 
 
Large capital inflows 
Sharp run-ups in equity prices 
Sharp run-ups in housing prices 
Inverted V-shaped growth trajectory 
Marked rise in indebtedness 
 
 
If we were to quantify periods of capital flow bonanzas -- periods where capital 
inflows are unusually large -- who comes up on the radar screen prior to the 2007-2009 
crisis?  As Reinhart and Reinhart (2008) document, in addition to the U.S. and the U.K., 
the other names that are listed there -- Spain, Italy, Iceland, Ireland -- are all countries 
that have had a period where the large capital inflows ended badly.  Capital inflows 
facilitate domestic lending, fuel asset prices, and in most instances increase the 
indebtedness of the private sector, the public sector (if  the government behaves 
procyclically), or both. 
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Table 2 Capital Inflows Typically Surge Ahead of Financial Crisis 
Countries with recent notable capital inflows 2006 2007 2008 
    
Bulgaria √ √ √ 
Iceland √ √ √ 
Italy √ √ √ 
Jamaica √ √ √ 
Latvia √ √ √ 
New Zealand √ √ √ 
Pakistan √ √ √ 
Romania √ √ √ 
Slovenia √ √ √ 
South Africa √ √ √ 
Spain √ √ √ 
Turkey √ √ √ 
United Kingdom √ √ √ 
United States √ √ √ 
Source:  Reinhart and Reinhart (2008). 
 
   
 
There is a sense that the U.S. housing price bubble during 2000-2006 (primarily) 
is both unique and unprecedented.  The magnitude of the bubble is certainly 
unprecedented to the United States--at least during the past century for which we have 
comparable data.  However, in a broader global context, the sub-prime bubble is neither 
unique to the U.S. nor it magnitudes out of line with other real estate bubbles that have 
also ended equally lamentably in financial crises.   
Figure 2 compares the run-up in housing prices. Period T represents the year of 
the onset of the financial crisis.  By that convention, period T-4 is four years prior to the 
crisis, and the graph in each case continues to T+3, except of course in the case of the 
U.S. 2007 crisis, which remains in the hands of the fates. The chart confirms the case 
study literature, showing the significant run-up in housing prices prior to a financial 
crisis.  Notably, the run-up in housing prices in the United States exceeds that of the “Big 
Five” crises (Spain, 1977, Norway, 1987, Finland, 1991, Sweden 1991, and Japan 1992).  
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The boom in real housing prices (or real estate, and other asset prices, more 
broadly)  is fueled by ample domestic credit availability, large capital inflows, and the 
easy liquidity environment that, and that this facilitates the boom.  Coupling the ample 
liquidity environment with the presumption that this time is different and that the old rules 
of valuation do not apply, then you have the makings or the ingredients for a crisis.   
As to growth (inverted V-shaped pattern) -- growth does very well ahead of the 
crisis when credit is ample and wealth effects are positive (as asset prices climb) and falls 
subsequently.  For further evidence the reader is referred to RR (2009).  
The importance of the last entry in Table 1, a marked rise in indebtedness, cannot 
be stressed enough.  Rising indebtedness can be domestic, external or both.  In can be 
private, public or both.  Any combination of these forms of rising indebtedness has been a 
hallmark of the pre-crisis period as far back as our data can take us.  Perhaps Iceland 
illustrates this point in its most extreme form, as external debts rise from about 90 percent 
of GDP in 2000 to well over 900 percent of GDP in 2009.  It is worth noting that stating 
that there are capital inflows is usually a different of observing that a country is borrowing 
from the rest of the world. 
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Figure 2. Percent Change in Real Housing Prices (2002-2006) and Banking Crisis 
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Source: Reinhart and Rogoff (2009).
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IV. The “Amplifiers” of Financial Crises 
 The list (shown on Table 3) of what are have dubbed the “usual suspects” (which 
ranges from pro-cyclical macroeconomic policies to overvalued currencies and myopic 
rating agencies) despite its breadth is not meant to be exhaustive.  It is a list that has 
withstood the test of time, as several of these amplifiers come up on a recurring and it is 
those are not unique to the United States subprime crisis.  Countless case studies of 
banking crises, across countries and time (see references in RR, 2009) list these factors 
on a recurring basis--often blamed as underlying causes of the crises.  However, it is my 
view that these factors exacerbate both the boom and bust phases of the crisis cycle.  For 
example, the stylized evidence presented in Caprio and Klingebiel (1996) suggests that 
inadequate regulation and lack of supervision at the time of the liberalization may play a 
key role in explaining why deregulation and banking crises are so closely entwined.  But 
it is difficult to explain a cycle with a constant.  Supervision may have always been 
lacking and the regulations ill defined.  But such deficiencies may have limited 
consequences when credit conditions are tight (or in the case of emerging markets when 
access to international capital markets is not possible). If, on the other hand, financial 
liberalization (domestic an external) create lending possibilities that did not exist before, 
then inadequate supervision can make a bad lending scenario worse.  Outright fraud, 
(often through connected lending) which crops up as another hardy perennial in studies of 
the run-up to crises works the same way. 
 The procyclicality of credit ratings (both at the sovereign and corporate levels, see 
Reinhart, 2002) also acts to amplify the cycle of lending and subsequent default and 
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crash.  Overvalued currencies are a magnet for capital inflows while procyclical fiscal 
policies add to the surge in borrowing during the boom phase of the cycle.   
 Far from being mutually exclusive many, if not most of the items in this list are 
present simultaneously in the most severe financial crises through out history. 
Table 3. Amplifliers of boom-bust cycles: The usual suspects 
Procyclical macroeconomic policies 
Hidden debts (implicit guarantees) 
Overvalued currencies 
Poor regulation 
Even worse supervision 
Outright fraud 
Myopic credit rating agencies 
 
IV. A Digression on Where We Are:  The Sequencing of Crises 
 
 
Just as financial crises have common macroeconomic antecedents in asset prices, 
economic activity, external indicators and so on, so common patterns appear in the 
sequencing (temporal order) in which crises unfold.  Obviously not all crises escalate to 
the extreme outcome of a sovereign default.  Yet, advanced economies have not been 
exempt from their share of currency crashes, bouts of inflation, severe banking crises, 
and, in an earlier era, even sovereign default.  The point of this short digression is to note 
that the long debt cycle we have discussed  does not necessarily end with a banking 
crisis—more bad news usually follows—a stylized fact that should be kept in mind when 
trying to make sense of the current conjuncture. 
Investigating what came first, banking or currency crises, was a central theme of  
Kaminsky and Reinhart’s (1999) “twin crises” work; they also concluded that financial 
liberalization often preceded banking crises; indeed, it helped predict them.  Demirgüç-
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Kunt and Detragiache (1998), who employed a different approach and a larger sample, 
arrived at the same conclusion.  Reinhart (2002) examined the currency crash–external 
default link.  Our work here has investigated the connections between domestic and 
external debt crises, inflation crises and default (domestic or external), and banking crises 
and external default.  Figure 3 maps out a “prototypical” sequence of events yielded by 
this literature.   
As Diaz-Alejandro (1985) narrates in his classic paper about the Chilean 
experience of the late 1970s and early 1980s, “Goodbye Financial Repression, Hello 
Financial Crash,” financial liberalization simultaneously facilitates banks’ access to 
external credit and more risky lending practices at home.  After a while, following a 
boom in lending and asset prices, weaknesses in bank balance sheets become manifest 
and problems in the banking sector begin. Often these problems are more advanced in the 
shakier institutions (such as finance companies) than in the major banks.   
The next stage in the crisis unfolds when the central bank begins to provide 
support for these institutions by extending credit to them.  If the exchange rate is heavily 
managed (it does not need to be explicitly pegged), a policy inconsistency arises between 
supporting the exchange rate and acting as lender of last resort to troubled institutions.  
The very numerous experiences in these studies suggest that (more often than not) the 
exchange rate objective is subjugated to the lender of last resort role of the central bank.  
Even if central bank lending to the troubled financial industry is limited in scope, the 
central bank may be more reluctant to engage in an “interest rate defense” policy to 
defend the currency than would be the case if the financial sector were sound. This brings 
the sequence illustrated in Figure 7 to the box labeled currency crash.  
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FIGURE 3 The sequencing of crises:  A prototype 
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Source:  Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein. 
 
The depreciation or devaluation, as the case may be, complicates the situation in 
(at least) three dimensions: (a) it exacerbates the problem of the banks who have 
borrowed in a foreign currency, worsening currency mismatches; (b) inflation usually 
worsens (The extent to which the currency crisis translates into higher inflation is highly 
uneven across countries, as countries with a history of very high and chronic inflation 
usually have a much higher and faster pass-through from exchange rates to prices); and 
(c) if the government has foreign currency–denominated debt, the currency depreciation 
increases the odds of an external and domestic default.  
At this stage, the banking crisis either peaks following the currency crash, if there 
is no sovereign credit crisis, or keeps getting worse as the crisis mounts and the economy 
marches toward a sovereign default (the next box in Figure 3).  
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This is a very common pattern in the sequencing of crises.  Notice the first entry 
there has financial liberalization.  And financial liberalization is really not just 
liberalization proper, but big innovation, creations of new market.  In the current 
conjuncture, the creation or the growth of securitization of mortgages, for example, was a 
big factor. Notice, perhaps more grimly, that the last entry is a debt crisis.  The series of 
events that began to play out in the summer of 2007 with the onset of the subprime crisis 
are still unfolding as the crisis morphs. This episode is not yet over. 
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